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Abstract
The transactional conflict problem arises in transactional systems when-
ever two or more concurrent transactions clash on a data item. While the
standard solution to such conflicts is to immediately abort one of the
transactions, some practical systems consider the alternative of delaying
conflict resolution for a short interval, which may allow one of the trans-
actions to commit. The challenge in the transactional conflict problem is
to choose the optimal length of this delay interval so as to minimize the
overall running time penalty for the conflicting transactions.
In this paper, we propose a family of optimal online algorithms for
the transactional conflict problem. Specifically, we consider variants of
this problem which arise in different implementations of transactional sys-
tems, namely “requestor wins” and “requestor aborts” implementations:
in the former, the recipient of a coherence request is aborted, whereas
in the latter, it is the requestor which has to abort. Both strategies are
implemented by real systems. We show that the requestor aborts case
can be reduced to a classic instance of the ski rental problem, while the
requestor wins case leads to a new version of this classical problem, for
which we derive optimal deterministic and randomized algorithms. More-
over, we prove that, under a simplified adversarial model, our algorithms
are constant-competitive with the offline optimum in terms of through-
put. We validate our algorithmic results empirically through a hardware
simulation of hardware transactional memory (HTM), showing that our
algorithms can lead to non-trivial performance improvements for classic
concurrent data structures.
1 Introduction
Several interesting tools and techniques have been developed to address the
challenge of making correct decisions about the future while holding limited
information, also known as online decision-making [3, 4, 7, 5, 13]. In this context,
the ski rental problem [20] is the question of choosing between continuing to pay
a recurring cost, and paying a larger one-time cost which eliminates or reduces
the recurring cost. The standard setting of the problem is as follows. A person
goes skiing for an unknown number of days D. On each day he or she can decide
whether or not to buy skis for a fixed price B. If the person decides not to buy
the skis, he or she has to rent them for a fixed cost per day i < B, where i is
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usually equal to 1. The challenge is to find an algorithm that minimizes the
expected cost of the ski tour over the number of days D.
In this paper, we phrase the problem of resolving conflicts efficiently in hard-
ware transactional systems [18] as an online decision problem. We abstract this
task as the following transactional conflict problem. Consider a database or
hardware transactional system, which allows concurrent executions of transac-
tions. The following scenario often arises in practice: a transaction T1 accesses
a set of data items, and is assigned ownership of a subset of these data items
(usually the items in its write set). Assume that T1 is executing concurrently
with another transaction T2, whose dataset intersects with that of T1. In this
case, this conflict of ownership is detected by the transactional system at run-
time, and the transactional implementation usually makes one of two choices
to resolve the conflict. The first strategy, usually called requestor wins [16, 23],
will have the transaction T2 abort the transaction T1, while T2 takes ownership
of the contended data item. The second strategy, called requestor aborts [16],
has transaction T2 abort, resolving the conflict in favor of T1.
To mitigate the high number of aborts caused by such conflicts, a number of
hardware proposals, e.g. [23, 15] allow the following strategy: instead of aborting
one of the transactions immediately, we allow the transaction a grace period ∆,
before aborting it. From the algorithmic perspective, assume our objective is to
maximize the likelyhood of a commit, while minimizing the expected value of
the delay added to the running time of the two transactions. By introducing a
grace period, we increase the running time of the delayed transaction T2. Yet,
since aborts are expensive, if T1 commits during the grace period, we may gain
in terms of the sum of runtime costs, since we could significantly decrease the
total running time of T1 if we do not abort it. Clearly, given this cost model, the
question of optimally setting the grace period ∆ is an online decision problem.
Contribution. Our results are as follows.
• We formalize the transactional conflict problem for both the requestor wins
and the requestor aborts conflict resolution strategies (Section 4).
• We give optimal deterministic and randomized solutions for both variants
(Section 5). Further, we analyze the performance of both schemes in the
setting where additional information is provided, in the form of the mean
of the underlying distribution of transaction lengths, and when chains of
transactions might conflict. We provide closed-form optimal solutions in
this case (Section 5.2).
• We show that, under an adversarial transaction scheduling model, our
algorithms are globally constant competitive in terms of the sum of run-
ning times of the transactions, i.e. inverse of throughput. (Section 6)
Further, we discuss strategies to add probabilistic progress guarantees to
our algorithms (Section 7).
• We validate our strategy on a hardware simulator implementation of HTM [18]
and in synthetic tests, showing that it can yield throughput improvements
of up to 4×, and that it is competitive with a finely-tuned manual approach
(Section 8).
The Transactional Conflict Problem. In more detail, the transactional
conflict problem presents the following trade-off. (Please see Figure 1 for an
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illustration.) Assume transaction T1 is interrupted by a conflicting transaction
T2, in a requestor wins implementation. We have the choice of aborting T1
immediately, or delaying the abort by a grace period ∆, in the hope that the
transaction will commit before ∆ expires. If the transaction T1 commits after
some additional time x < ∆, then we have added x time steps to the running
time of T2; yet, since T1 commits, we do not incur any additional time penalty
for this transaction. If the transaction T1 has not committed within the ∆ grace
period, then we will abort it. In this case, we wasted 2∆ time units in terms of
the total running time of the transactions: one ∆ for which we have delayed T2,
and one ∆ for which we have increased the total running time of T1, without
committing it. (Since T1 will have to redo all its computation in case of abort,
none of the executed steps is useful.) In addition, we assume that we always
incur a (large) cost B for having aborted the transaction.
In sum, given the unknown remaining running time x of the transaction T1,
the task is to compute the grace period ∆ which optimizes the trade-off between
the cost x we pay in the case where x < ∆, and the cost 2∆ +B which we pay
in the case where ∆ ≤ x. This problem clearly appears to be related to the ski
rental problem, and it is tempting to think that its solution follows by simple
reduction.
However, this is not the case, due to the different structure of the cost func-
tion. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that this difference significantly alters the
optimal strategy, as well as the competitive ratio. For example, for two transac-
tions and a requestor wins implementation, we prove that the optimal strategy
is a uniform random choice in the interval [0, B), and its competitive ratio is 2.
By contrast, the optimal strategy for requestor aborts implementations, which
coincides with the classic ski rental problem, is the exponentially decaying prob-
ability distribution, with competitive ratio e/(e − 1). This trade-off becomes
more complex for conflict chains involving more than two transactions. We also
consider this case in this paper.
Extensions and Techniques. We consider and solve two natural extensions of
the problem. The first is to consider larger conflict chains, when more than two
distinct transactions may be involved in a conflict. The second is the case where
the length of each transaction is assumed to come from an arbitrary probability
distribution, whose mean µ is known. For instance, this corresponds to a profiler
which records the empirical mean over all successful executions of a transaction,
and uses this information when deciding the grace period length.
On the technical side, we give a unified technique for optimally solving
parametrized instances of this online decision problem; in particular, we pro-
vide closed-form solutions for the general case with arbitrarily many conflicting
transactions and mean constraints. Our main analytic tool is a non-trivial in-
stance of the method of Lagrange multipliers tailored to this problem, building
on an analysis by Khanafer et al. [8] for the ski rental problem.
Order-Optimality. Starting from the competitiveness of local decisions, we
show that, under a simplified adversarial conflict model for a system of n threads
executing concurrent transactions, the algorithms we propose are globally com-
petitive with an offline-optimal solution in terms of the sum of running times
of transactions (intuitively, the inverse of throughput). Specifically, if the tim-
ing of conflicts between transactions is decided by an adversary, then we prove
that the running time penalty incurred by all transactions using our scheme
is constant-competitive with a perfect-information algorithm, which knows the
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remaining running time of each transaction at conflict time.
Experimental Results. We validate our results empirically, using both a
synthetic testbed, and an implementation of a requestor-wins hardware trans-
actional memory (HTM) system on top of the MIT Graphite processor sim-
ulator [22], executing data structure and transactional benchmarks. The syn-
thetic experiments closely match our theoretical results. The HTM experiments
suggest that adding delays can improve performance in HTM implementations
under contention, and does not adversely impact performance in uncontended
ones. Of note, we observe that our algorithms perform well even when compared
with a finely-tuned approach, which uses knowledge about the application and
implementation to manually fine-tune the delays.
Implications. The general problem of contention management in the context
of transactional memory has been considered before [14], and several efficient
strategies are known, e.g. [14, 17]. The main distinction from our setting is
that contention managers (for instance in software TM) are usually assumed
to have global knowledge about the set of running transactions, and possibly
their abort history. By contrast, in our setting, decisions are entirely local, as
well as immediate and unchangeable. In this context, our algorithms implement
a distributed, online contention manager. We find it surprising that constant-
competitive throughput bounds can be obtained in this restrictive setting.
A second implication of our work concerns requestor wins versus requestor
aborts conflict resolution. Most systems only implement one such strategy, but
our analytic results show a trade-off between contention and the performance
of these two paradigms. In particular, requestor aborts is more efficient under
low contention, whereas requestor wins is more efficient when conflicts involve
more than two transactions. This suggests that a hybrid strategy, which can
alternate between the two, would perform best.
2 Related Work
The ski rental problem was introduced by Karlin, Manasse, Rudolph, and
Sleator in [21], where the authors give optimal deterministic 2-competitive algo-
rithms for the classic version of the ski rental problem. Follow-up work by Karlin
et al. [20] showed that randomized algorithms can improve on this competitive
ratio to e/(e − 1), which is optimal [24]. Several variants of this problem have
been studied, e.g. [5, 19, 12, 8], with strong practical applications, e.g. [12, 8].
We refer the reader to the excellent survey by Albers [6] for an overview of the
area, and to Section 3.3 for technical background on the problem.
The work that is technically closest to ours is by Khanafer et al. [8]: they
define a constrained version of the ski rental problem, in which constraints such
as the mean and variance of the underlying distribution from which the unknown
parameter is chosen are added. The authors provide bounds on the improvement
in terms of competitive ratio provided by these additional constraints. The basic
technical ingredients we employ, notably the method of Lagrange multipliers, are
similar to those of this work. However, we consider a significantly more complex
instance of the problem, which requires a more involved analysis.
The problem of designing efficient contention management in the context of
transactional memory [18] has received significant research attention, especially
since such systems are already present in hardware by major vendors [1]. Several
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applied papers, e.g. [16, 9, 23, 11] discuss the trade-offs involved in implementing
transactional protocols in hardware, and the performance pathologies of such
systems. Reference [23] explicitly discusses the possibility of adding delays to
hardware transactions, and implements and compares heuristics for tuning these
delays. We believe we are the first to abstract the problem of setting the delays
while minimizing running time impact, and to solve it optimally. As noted, the
contention management problem has been abstracted by [14] in the context of
software TM (STM), and there is a considerable amount of work on this topic,
e.g. [14, 17, 10, 25]. However, to our understanding, all these systems assume
a contention manager module with global knowledge about the set of running
transactions, which is reasonable in the context of STM; by contrast, we analyze
a setting where only local, immediate, and unchangeable decisions are possible,
which is the case for HTM.
3 Model and Preliminaries
3.1 Shared-Memory Transactions
We consider an asynchronous shared-memory model in which n processors com-
municate by performing atomic operations to shared memory. We assume that
standard read-write atomic operations are available to the processors.
We are interested in a setting where processors execute sequences of basic
read-write operations atomically, as transactions. Specifically, a transaction is a
set of read and write operations, which are guaranteed to be executed atomically
if the transaction commits. Otherwise, if the transaction aborts, then none of
the operations is applied to shared memory. Many hardware implementations
of transactional memory use some version of the pattern shown in Algorithm 1
below.
Notice that, if several transactions with overlapping read and write sets
may execute or attempt to commit at the same time, then they may conflict
in the commit phase. In particular, consider the following example, involving
transactional objects A,B and C:
A transaction T1 performing [A ← B + 1;C = 3] and a transaction T2
performing [A ← B + 2] from an initial state of A = B = 0 can conflict in the
commit phase as follows. Imagine T1 holds variable A in Exclusive state locally,
and is in the process of acquiring variable B in Exclusive state, so that it can
commit. Then T2 starts executing its Commit phase, and sends a coherence
message to T1, asking for A in Exclusive state. At this point, T1 has two
choices: it can either relinquish exclusive access of A, and abort its transaction
(see Figure 1a), or delay the request by A for some time, hoping that it will
commit soon (see Figure 1b). In the following, we will look at algorithms for
making this choice. Note that we will use both terms algorithm and strategy
meaning the same thing from now on.
3.2 Conflict and Cost Models
Transaction Conflict Scheduling. As described, we have n threads, each
of which has a virtually infinite sequence of transactions to execute. Threads
proceed to execute these transactions in parallel. At arbitrary times during the
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Algorithm 1 Simplified Pseudocode for Hardware Transactional Memory im-
plementation.
1: function transaction(code)
2: // Use a MESI cache coherence protocol, except each cache line has an
additional bit. This additional bit is set if cache line is used by transac-
tion. In this case, cache line is called transactional and it resides in the
transactional cache.
3: // Execution phase
4: if at any point transactional cache line is evicted, abort transaction.
5: if transaction is aborted, invalidate all transactional cache lines.
6: for each access in code do
7: if read then
8: Try to acquire the transactional cache line in a shared or exclusive
state.
9: Conflict arises if some transaction has the required cache line in
its transactional cache in a modified state.
10: if write then
11: Try to invalidate all existing copies of the required cache line, then
change a state of the cache line to modified.
12: Conflict arises if some transaction has a copy of the line in its
tranactional cache.
13: // Commit phase
14: if transaction is not aborted in the execution phase, then commit, by
clearing additional bits in all transactional cache lines.
execution, an adversary can interrupt a pair of transactions, and put them in
conflict: one of them will be the requestor, and the other one is the receiver.
The algorithm has the choice of resolving the conflict immediately, by aborting
the one of the transactions, or to postpone the abort for a grace period ∆. The
cost model is specified for each conflict resolution strategy in Section 4.
Upon aborting a transaction, the thread will restart its execution immedi-
ately. Initially, the conflicted transaction will no longer be in conflict with any
other transaction, although it may become conflicted if chosen by the adversary.
Upon committing a transaction, the thread moves to the next transaction in its
input. During its grace period, a receiver transaction may become conflicted
as a requestor with another transaction, since it may need to access some new
data item.
Additional Assumptions. In the following, we will assume a simplified version
of the conflict model, and analyze the global competitiveness of our strategies.
In particular, we assume that (a) a transaction that is part of a conflict as a
requestor cannot become part of a new conflict as a receiver, (b) a transaction
that is currently during its grace period cannot be conflicted again as a receiver
by the adversary (but the transaction may be conflicted as a requestor), and
(c) that conflicts cannot be cyclic. Assumptions (a) and (b) are in some sense
necessary given our strong adversarial model: we wish to ensure that the adver-
sary can only inflict the same set of conflicts on the offline optimal strategy as
to the online decision algorithm. We note that assumption (c) is implemented
by some real-world HTM implementations, which actively detect conflict cycles,
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Conflict T1 aborts
T2
T1
Time
B x
(a) Requestor wins scenario. Here, T1
has been running for B time steps
when a conflict with T2 is detected. T1
has the possibility of delaying T2’s mes-
sage response for x steps before abort-
ing itself. The “wasted” time added to
the execution of both transactions in
case T1 aborts is shown in red.
Conflict Abort T2
T2
T1
Time
B x
(b) Requestor aborts scenario. Again,
T1 has been running for B time steps
when a conflict with T2 is detected. T1
has the possibility of delaying T2’s mes-
sage response for x steps before abort-
ing T2. The “wasted” time added to
the execution of both transactions in
case T2 aborts is shown in red.
Figure 1: The transactional conflict problem for the two conflict resolution
strategies.
and abort all transactions involved upon such events [2].
Cost Model. Given the above setup, our cost model is defined as follows. Fix
an adversarial conflict strategy S, and a (possibly randomized) algorithm A
for resolving conflicts. For each transaction T , define Γ(T,A) be the expected
length of the interval between T ’s starting time (i.e., the first time it is invoked)
and its eventual commit time, assuming conflicts induced by S. We analyze
strategies for deciding the grace period, which minimize the expected sum of
running times of transactions. Formally, we wish to find an algorithm A such
that, for any adversarial strategy S,
∑
T Γ(T,A) is minimized.
3.3 Background on the Ski Rental Problem
We recall the definition of the ski rental problem [20]: a person goes skiing for
an unknown number of days D. On each day, he or she can decide whether
or not to buy skis for a fixed price B. If the person decides to not buy the
skis, he or she has to rent them for a fixed cost per day c < B, which we will
choose w.l.o.g. to be equal to 1. The challenge is to find an algorithm that
minimizes the expected cost of the ski tour over the number of days D. The
optimal cost with foresight for this problem is clearly min(D,B), and the optimal
online deterministic strategy has cost 2B − 1 if D ≥ B. So the deterministic
competitive ratio is basically 2. It is known that one can do better by employing
a randomized strategy [20]:
Theorem 1 Consider a strategy where, for each day i ≥ 1, with probability pi,
we rent skis on day i. Then, if we take p(i) =
(
B−1
B
)B−i 1
B[1−(1−1/B)B ] , for days
i ≤ B, and 0 otherwise, we pay expected total cost
(
e
e−1
)
min(D,B).
Using additional knowledge about the adversarial distribution, e.g. the mean
µ, it is known that one can improve the strategy further [8]:
Theorem 2 Knowledge of the mean µ of the adversarial function pi(y) yields
a new randomized strategy p(x) for the standard ski rental problem, namely if
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µ
B < 2
e−2
e−1 , then
p(x) =
{
1
B(e−2)e
x
B − 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ B
0, else.
The competitive ratio improves to 1 + µ2B(e−2) . Otherwise, the previous strategy
is optimal.
4 The Transactional Conflict
Problem
We now formalize our problem, assuming the transactional model in Section 3.
As the cost metric is different depending on the contention resolution strategy,
we define the problem differently for each case. For simplicity, we will start by
defining the problem for the case with two conflicting transactions, and then
extend to the case with longer conflict chains.
4.1 Problem Statement for Requestor Wins
Two Conflicting Transactions. Assume that an executing transaction T1
(the receiver) is interrupted by a transaction T2 (the requestor), and that we
have the choice between aborting T1 immediately, and postponing T1’s abort by
x steps, in the hope that it commits. Assume that T1 still has to execute for
D time steps (unknown) to commit, and that aborting T1 immediately incurs
a fixed cost B.1 We define the conflict cost as follows: (1) If D ≤ x, then
transaction T1 commits at or before x, and we only pay the time by which we
delayed T2, which is D. In terms of the sum of running times, our delay decision
added D to the total cost. (2) If D > x, then transaction T1 has not committed
at x, and we will abort T1, allowing T2 to continue. We will pay the abort cost
B, the additional time x by which we ran T1, and the additional time x by
which T2 was delayed. This sums up to 2x+B.
The General Case. In general, the conflict chain may be longer, as several
transactions may be delayed if we decide to extend T1’s execution. For example,
a third transaction T3 may already be waiting on T2 to commit at the point
where T2 conflicts with T1. Assume that k ≥ 2 transactions, including T1, are
conflicting, forming a conflict chain. This means that delaying T1’s abort by
one step will add k − 1 time steps to the total running time of all transactions.
In this case, the cost metric becomes:
• If D ≤ x, then T1 commits, and we pay the time by which we delayed all
transactions other than T1, which is (k − 1)D.
• If D > x, then we abort T1, and pay the abort cost B and the additional
time x by which we ran T1, as well as the additional time (k − 1)x by
which other transactions are delayed. This sums up to kx+B.
We will first focus on decision algorithms which optimize the expected cost of
each conflict. Later, in Section 6, we will show how to use competitive bounds on
1In practice, the cost B will consist of the time for which the transaction T1 has already
been running when interrupted, plus a fixed non-trivial cleanup cost.
8
individual conflict cost to obtain competitive bounds on the throughput. We are
trying to identify the probability distribution p which minimizes the expected
decision cost under arbitrary adversarial choices D. Formally, for arbitrary D,
and fixed k and B as above,
p = argminpCost(p(x), D), where
Cost(p(x), D) =
∫ D
0
(kx+B)p(x)dx
+ (k − 1)
∫ B
k−1
D
Dp(x)dx,
where we have noticed that for D > B/(k − 1) the algorithm will always abort.
Notice that the offline optimum is min(B, (k − 1)D).
4.2 Problem Statement for Requestor Aborts
Two Conflicting Transactions. The converse case is when the receiving
transaction T1 can abort or delay any requestor transaction T2. Again, we might
choose to delay the conflict resolution by a grace period of x steps. Assume that
T2 still has to execute for D steps to commit, where D is unknown. The conflict
cost is now as follows:
• If D ≤ x, then transaction T1 commits at or before x, and we only pay
the time by which we delayed the incoming transaction T2, i.e., D.
• If D > x, then transaction T1 has not committed at x, and we will abort
T2 and continue. In this case, we pay as extra cost B, a fixed abort cost,
plus the time by which T2 was delayed, i.e. total cost x+B.
Notice that the optimal cost with foresight is OPT = min(B,D). By com-
paring variables we realize that there exists a direct mapping between the ski
rental problem and the requestor aborts version of the transactional conflict
problem:
The point where the requesting transaction T2 interrupts transaction T1
marks day 1 of the ski rental problem. Furthermore, we have that D, the
unknown number of steps until T1 would eventually commit, denotes the day
on which the adversary chooses to stop us from skiing. The choice of x i.e. the
length of the grace period by which T1 delays T2, is the same as to choose that
we buy skis on day x + 1. Finally, the fixed extra cost B in the transactional
conflict problem is the equivalent to the cost B of buying the skis. Note that in
this case we assume that for the transactional conflict problem if x = D, T1 is
not able to commit and thus it aborts. If x > D, T1 will be able to commit on
time step D. Figure 1b illustrates this case. The results in Theorems 1 and 2
apply to this case.
Generalizing to conflicts of size k > 2 is also possible:
Theorem 3 if µ+2((k−1)(e
1
k−1−1)−1)
B < 2((k−1)(e
1
k−1 −1)−1) the optimal PDF
is:
p(x) =

(k−1)
B((e
1
k−1−1)(k−1)−1)
(e
x
B − 1), 0 ≤ x ≤ Bk−1
0, otherwise
,
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and otherwise the optimal PDF is:
p(x) =

(k−1)
B(e
1
k−1−1)(k−1)
e
x
B , 0 ≤ x ≤ Bk−1
0, otherwise
Proof. In the requestor aborts case for k > 2 transactions, we have one
receiver transaction T1 and k − 1 requestor transactions. Therefore in abort
case, since we abort k − 1 transactions, the extra cost becomes (k − 1)(∆ +B).
This gives us the following cost function :
Cost(p(x),y) =
∫ y
0
(k − 1)(x+B)p(x)dx+ (k − 1)
∫ B
k−1
y
yp(x)dx (1)
Thus our Lagrangian function looks as follows:
L(p(x), λ1,λ2) =
∫ B
k−1
0
(
Cost(p(x),y)
(k − 1)y − λ1 − λ2y
)
pi(y)dy
+ piK ·
(∫ B
k−1
0
(k − 1)(x+B)
B
p(x)dx− λ1 − λ2K
)
+ λ1 + λ2µ
We note that, since the adversarial strategy is arbitrary, we will need the
following two constraints:
Cost(p(x),y)
(k − 1)y = λ1 + λ2y (2)∫ B
k−1
0
(k − 1)(x+B)
B
p(x)dx = λ1 + λ2K (3)
By differentiating the constraint (2) twice w.r.t. y and substituting y with
x we get
p′(x)B − p(x) = 2λ2
Solving this first order differential equation gives us:
p(x) = αe
x
B − 2λ2 (4)
We can solve for α by using the fact that p(x) is a PDF
α =
(k − 1) + 2Bλ2
B(e
1
k−1 − 1)(k − 1)
(5)
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By substituting (4) into our constraint (2) we get
(αBe
y
B − 2λ2y)B − αB2 − αB2e
y
B + λ2y
2+
αB2 + yαBe
1
k−1 − 2yλ2 B
k − 1 = y(λ1 + λ2y)
α(−B2 +B2 +B2e yB −B2e yB + yBe 1k−1 )−
λ2(2yB − y2 + 2y B
k − 1) = y(λ1 + λ2y)
αBe
1
k−1 − λ2(2B + 2 B
k − 1) = λ1
Using (5) we get:
e
1
k−1
e
1
k−1 − 1
− λ2 · 2
(
B − B
(e
1
k−1 − 1)(k − 1)
)
= λ1 (6)
Similarly substituting (4) into constraint (3) we get:
αBe
1
k−1 − λ2
(
2B +
B
k − 1
)
= λ1 + λ2K
e
1
k−1
e
1
k−1 − 1
−
λ2 · 2
(
B
2(k − 1) +B +
K
2
− Be
1
k−1
(e
1
k−1 − 1)(k − 1)
)
= λ1 (7)
In order for (6) and (7) to be true at the same time we need
K =
B
k − 1 (8)
Since we know that p(x) is a PDF we know that ∀x ∈ [0, Bk−1 ], p(x) ≥ 0 and
thus we get
(
1− e
x
B
(e
1
k−1 − 1)(k − 1)
)
λ2 ≤ e
x
B
2B(e
1
k−1 − 1)
Thus we get the following constraints on λ2:
λ2 ≤ (k − 1)e
x
B
2B((k − 1)(e 1k−1 − 1)− e xB )
,
if 0 ≤ x ≤ B log
(
(k − 1)(e 1k−1 − 1)
)
(9)
λ2 >
(k − 1)e xB
2B((k − 1)(e 1k−1 − 1)− e xB )
,
if B log
(
(k − 1)(e 1k−1 − 1)
)
< x ≤ B
k − 1 (10)
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We immediately realize that the r.h.s. of (9) is positive and strictly increas-
ing, whereas the r.h.s. of (10) is negative. Thus we now know that we must
have
0 ≤ λ2 ≤ k − 1
2B((k − 1)(e 1k−1 − 1)− 1)
Thus our problem becomes:
min
λ1,λ2
λ1 + λ2µ s.t.
e
1
k−1
e
1
k−1 − 1
− λ2 · 2
(
B − Be
1
k−1
(e
1
k−1 − 1)(k − 1)
+B
)
= λ1 (11)
e
1
k−1
e
1
k−1 − 1
− λ2 · 2
(
B
2(k − 1) +B +
K
2
− Be
1
k−1
(e
1
k−1 − 1)(k − 1)
)
= λ1 (12)
∀λ1 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ k − 1
2B((k − 1)(e 1k−1 − 1)− 1)
We already realized that (8). We further remind ourselves that the solutions
to this linear program have to form a convex polytope and that each basic fea-
sible solution is a corner point of that polytope. Therefore we get the following
two corner points
c1 =
(
e
1
k−1
e
1
k−1 − 1
, 0
)
and c2 =
(
1,
k − 1
2B((k − 1)(e 1k−1 − 1)− 1)
)
This gives us the following C’s
C1 =
e
1
k−1
e
1
k−1 − 1
and C2 = 1 +
µ(k − 1)
2B((k − 1)(e 1k−1 − 1)− 1)
Notice that for λ2 = 0 we do not take the mean into account and thus are
left with the solution for the non-constrained ski rental problem. For λ2 6= 0
we realize that C2 < C1 is only valid for small values of µ. More precisely,
C2 < C1, for
µ+2((k−1)(e
1
k−1−1)−1)
B < 2((k − 1)(e
1
k−1 − 1) − 1). For B > 1 it
simplifies to µB−1 < 2((k − 1)(e
1
k−1 − 1)− 1). 
5 Analysis for Requestor Wins
In the following, we will focus on analyzing optimal strategies for the requestor
wins strategy. In particular, we will examine the optimal deterministic strat-
egy for the unconstrained case, in which no additional information about the
adversarial distribution is known, and optimal randomized strategies for the con-
strained case, in which the first moment of the adversarial length distribution is
known. (This case also convers the randomized unconstrained case, so we solve
them together.)
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5.1 The Deterministic Unconstrained Case
Since the algorithm is deterministic, it has to choose a time step x at which to
abort. Denote by D the time step at which the transaction would commit, if
allowed to execute. Throughout the rest of this section, unless stated otherwise,
the expression we abort means that the receiving transaction aborts.
Observe that the optimal cost is min((D(k − 1), B). For simplicity, let us
assume that Bk−1 is an integer. There are two cases we need to examine. The
first one is x ≤ D, in which we pay cost kx + B. The second one is x > D,
in which we pay cost (k − 1)D. Note that the adversary knows after which
time step x we decided to abort, and thus will never choose to set the end of
transaction after x. The following result characterizes the optimal deterministic
strategy.
Theorem 4 The optimal deterministic strategy always chooses to abort after
B
k−1 time steps. This strategy has total cost
(
2 + 1k−1
)
min((D(k − 1), B).
Proof. Let x denote the time step on which we chose to abort. We first notice
that we can reduce the case where x ≤ D to x = D, since our cost will not
increase after the abort. Thus, delaying the end of transaction can only decrease
the competitive ratio. The competitive ratio for x = D looks as follows
kx+B
min((k − 1)x,B) (13)
For x > D we get
D(k − 1)
min(D(k − 1), B)
as the competitive ratio. This clearly is a non-decreasing function. Thus the
adversary would choose D = x − 1 to maximize our cost. Therefore, we have
competitive ratio (x−1)(k−1)min((x−1)(k−1),B) . Because this is at most
kx+B
min((k−1)x,B) , the
adversary will always prefer D = x. We obtain that our strategy will always
yield competitive ratio (13). Analyzing this we get
kx+B
min((k − 1)x,B) =1 +
x
min((k − 1)x,B)+
max((k − 1)x,B)
min((k − 1)x,B) ,
which is minimized for x = Bk−1 , yielding ratio:
2 +
1
k − 1 . (14)

5.2 Randomized Strategies for Transactional Conflict
In this section, we discuss the transactional conflict problem where we have
some knowledge about the distribution pi(y) of the adversarial function. For
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simplicity, we will consider the case where k = 2, i.e. the conflict involves only
two transactions, and address the general case in a later section. Our goal is to
prove the following.
Theorem 5 For arbitrary adversarial distributions, the following randomized
strategy p(x) is optimal: p(x) = 1/B for
0 ≤ x ≤ B, and 0,otherwise. This yields competitive ratio 2 for the conflict
cost.
Knowledge of the mean µ of the adversarial function pi(y) yields the following
strategy p(x) for the transactional conflict problem. If µB < 2(ln 4− 1), then the
optimal strategy is
p(x) =
{
ln B+xx
B(ln 4−1) , 0 ≤ x ≤ B
0, otherwise.
In this case, the competitive ratio improves to 1 + µ2B(ln 4−1) . If
µ
B ≥ 2(ln 4− 1),
then the unconstrained strategy is optimal.
Proof. It is easy to show that for arbitrary adversarial distributions above
randomized strategy yields competitive ratio 2. Optimality of this strategy can
be proven using the same techniques as in [8]. Note that for k > 2, the following
strategy is optimal and 2-competitive: p(x) = k − 1/B for
0 ≤ x ≤ B/(k − 1), and 0,otherwise. Proof is analogous to k = 2 case.
Let x be a time step at which we decide to abort and let y be a time step
at which we would finish the computation. x is chosen with the distribution p
and y is chosen with the distribution pi. Notice that we will always abort at
time step B the latest, because otherwise our cost will be greater than if we had
aborted at time step 0. If y < x, we pay y. Otherwise, we pay 2x + B. Let
Cost(p(x), y) be the expected cost for the fixed y. We have that
Cost(p(x), y) =
∫ y
0
(2x+B)p(x)dx+ y ·
∫ B
y
p(x)dx.
We know that the optimal cost is min(y,B). This gives us a necessity to intro-
duce non-zero probability piK for y to be chosen from outside the interval [0, B],
because otherwise the trivial optimal strategy is to never abort. Our goal is to
minimize the ratio
G(p(x), pi(y)) =
∫ B
0
Cost(p(x), y)
y
pi(y)dy
+ piK ·
∫ B
0
2x+B
B
p(x)dx.
Considering that we want to find the best possible solution under the worst case
distribution pi(y) of the adversary our problem looks as follows
min
p(x)
max
pi(y)
G(p(x), pi(y)). (15)
We will give a closed-form solution for this as follows. We first construct the
Lagrangian function L for the maximization problem in (15). Afterwards we will
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construct its dual to get the necessary constraints. We will then differentiate
one of the constraints twice, leaving us with a first order differential equation
for p(x). Solving this yields the desired PDF p(x). Finally, we substitute p(x)
into the constraints to solve for the Lagrangian multipliers.
The Lagrangian function L takes as inputs the probability distribution pi(y)
of the adversary and the two Lagrange multipliers λ1 and λ2. The two multi-
pliers act as weights for the constraints given by the fact that pi(y) is a PDF
with the mean µ. Thus, we get the following Lagrangian for the maximization
problem:
L(pi(y), λ1, λ2) =
∫ B
0
Cost(p(x), y)
y
pi(y)dy
+ piK ·
∫ B
0
2x+B
B
p(x)dx
− λ1 ·
[∫ B
0
pi(y)dy + piK − 1
]
− λ2 ·
[∫ B
0
ypi(y)dy +K · piK − µ
]
=
∫ B
0
(
Cost(p(x), y)
y
− λ1 − λ2y
)
· pi(y)dy
+ piK ·
(∫ B
0
2x+B
B
p(x)dx− λ1 − λ2K
)
+ (λ1 + λ2µ) .
Therefore, its dual is h(λ1, λ2) = suppi(y) L(pi(y), λ1, λ2). We note that, since the
adversarial strategy is arbitrary and we want to minimize the dual function, we
will need constraints Cost(p(x),y)y −λ1−λ2y = 0 and
∫ B
0
2x+B
B p(x)dx−λ1−λ2K =
0, to ensure that the Lagrangian function does not depend on the choice of pi(y).
Therefore we get the following minimization problem:
min
p(x),λ1,λ2
λ1 + λ2µ s.t.∫ y
0
(2x+B)p(x)dx+ y · ∫ B
y
p(x)dx
y
= λ1 + λ2y (16)∫ B
0
2x+B
B
p(x)dx = λ1 + λ2K (17)
∀λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 and y ∈ [0, B]
Because the constraint (16) holds for every y ∈ [0, B], we can differentiate
it twice with respect to y and after we substitute y with x we get the first
order differential equation p′(x) = 1B+x2λ2. Solving this yields our strategy
p(x) = α + 2λ2 ln(B + x). Using the fact that p(x) is a PDF we get that
α = 1B − 2λ2(lnB + ln 4 − 1). Since ∀x, p(x) ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0 we further have
0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 12B(ln 4−1) . Thus our problem becomes:
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min
λ1,λ2
λ1 + λ2µ such that
[(4 ln 2B − 4 ln 4B + 2)B]λ2 + 2 = λ1 (18)
[(4 ln 2B − 4 ln 4B + 3)B −K]λ2 + 2 = λ1 (19)
∀λ1 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1
2B(ln 4− 1)
We immediately realize that for λ2 6= 0 we must have K = B in order to
satisfy (18) and (19) simultaneously. We remind ourselves that the solutions to
this linear program have to form a convex polytope and that each basic feasible
solution is a corner point of that polytope. Therefore we get two corner points
c1 = (2, 0) and c2 =
(
1, 12B(ln 4−1)
)
with corresponding competitive ratios C1 =
2 and C2 = 1 +
µ
2B(ln 4−1) . Notice that for λ2 = 0 we do not take the mean into
account and thus are left with the solution for the non-constrained ski rental
problem. For λ2 6= 0 we realize that C2 < C1 is only valid for small values of
µ. More precisely, C2 < C1, for
µ
B < 2(ln 4 − 1). Thus, if µB < 2(ln 4 − 1) the
optimal PDF is:
p(x) =
{
ln B+xB
B(ln 4−1) , 0 ≤ x ≤ B
0, otherwise.
Otherwise, the unconstrained strategy is optimal. 
5.3 Discussion
Competitive Ratio Comparison. We compare this result with the requestor
aborts case (classic ski rental) [8]. Depending on the case distinction, we get:
• inequality holds: In this case we have a competitive ratio of 1 + µ2B(ln 4−1)
for requestor wins and 1+ µ2B(e−2) for requestor aborts. Clearly, requestor
aborts outperforms requestor wins. Additionally, we get that the inequal-
ity which has to hold in order for this strategy to be applicable, is less
strict for the requestor aborts case.
• inequality does not hold: If the inequality does not hold we get competitive
ratio 2 for the requestor wins strategy and ee−1 for the requestor aborts
strategy. Again, we notice that the competitive ratio of requestor aborts
is smaller than the one for requestor wins.
Thus, we can conclude that with respect to the competitive ratio for a single
waiting transaction (k = 2), the transactional conflict problem should be tackled
by the requestor aborts strategy. We note that this may no longer be the case
for k ≥ 3.
Abort probability. We now examine the probability that a transaction aborts,
in the case where y ≤ B. (Otherwise, it is more advantageous to abort the
current transaction than to delay the system for > B steps.) Notice that in this
case, the adversary’s best strategy is to set y = B. We obtain the following by
direct computation:
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• requestor wins: 1− p(B) = 1− ln 2B(ln 4−1) ' 1− 1.8/B
• requestor aborts: 1− p(B) = 1− e−1B(e−2) ' 1− 2.4/B.
Hence, the requestor aborts optimal strategy is less likely to abort a transaction,
under the same conditions.
5.4 Constrained Problem for
Conflict Size k > 2
A more involved analysis solves the general case where conflicts are of size k > 2.
Theorem 6 Consider an instance of requestor-wins transactional conflict where
k ≥ 3 transactions are involved. Given the fixed cost B > 0, and the mean of
the adversarial distribution µ > 0, then the optimal PDF p(x) is as follows.
If µB ≤ k
k−1−2(k−1)k−1
(k−2)(kk−1−(k−1)k−1) , then :
p(x) =

(B+x)k−2(k−1)k(2(k−1)k−1+kk−1)
Bk−1(kk−1−(k−1)k−1)(kk−1−2(k−1)k−1)−
4(k−1)k
B(kk−1−2(k−1)k−1) , 0 ≤ x ≤ Bk−1 ,
0, otherwise.
Otherwise, or if the mean is unknown, the optimal PDF is :
p(x) =
{
(B+x)k−2(k−1)k
Bk−1(kk−1−(k−1)k−1) , 0 ≤ x ≤ Bk−1 ,
0, otherwise.
Proof. We can follow the same steps as in the k = 2 case, but with more
technical care. Our cost function becomes:
Cost(p(x), y) =
∫ y
0
(kx+B)p(x)dx+ (k − 1)
∫ B
k−1
y
yp(x)dx,
and so the corresponding Lagrangian function is:
L(p(x), λ1, λ2) =
∫ B
k−1
0
(
Cost(p(x),y)
(k − 1)y − λ1 − λ2y
)
pi(y)dy
+ piK ·
(∫ B
k−1
0
kx+B
B
p(x)dx− λ1 − λ2K
)
+ λ1 + λ2µ.
We note that, since the adversarial strategy is arbitrary, we will need the
following two constraints:
Cost(p(x),y)
(k − 1)y = λ1 + λ2y (20)∫ B
k−1
0
kx+B
B
p(x)dx = λ1 + λ2K (21)
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which yields the linear program:
min
p(x),λ1,λ2
λ1 + λ2µ s.t.∫ y
0
(kx+B)p(x)dx+ y · ∫ B
y
p(x)dx
(k − 1)y = λ1 + λ2y (22)∫ B
0
kx+B
B
p(x)dx = λ1 + λ2K (23)
∀λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 and y ∈ [0, B
k − 1 ]
By differentiating (22) twice with respect to y and substituting y with x we
get:
p′(x)(x+B)− (k − 2)p(x) = 2(k − 1)λ2.
Solving this first order differential equation we get
p(x) = α(B + x)k−2 − 2λ2(k − 1)
k − 2 .
Using the fact that p(x) is a PDF we can solve for α:
α =
B(k − 1)k(2λ2B + k − 2)
(k − 2)
[
(k − 1)( Bkk−1 )k − kBk
]
=
λ2(2B
2k(k − 1))
(k − 2)
[
(k − 1)( Bkk−1 )k − kBk
] + B(k − 1)k
(k − 1)( Bkk−1 )k − kBk
.
Substituting p(x) into the constraint (22) yields:
λ2
(
2B
k − 2 ·
kk−1
kk−1 − (k − 1)k−1 −
4B
k − 2
)
+
kk−1
kk−1 − (k − 1)k−1 = λ1.
We know that p(x) is a PDF so we have p(x) ≥ 0 for x ∈ [0, Bk−1 ]. This
means that P (x) = α(B + x)k−2 − 2λ2(k−1)k−2 ≥ 0. Also, α > 0 and B > 0, and
so p(x) is an increasing function. Thus, it is enough to check if p(0) ≥ 0. This
gives us following constraint on λ2:
λ2 ≤ 2(k − 2)
B
(k−1)k−1
kk−1−(k−1)k−1
1− (k−1)k−1
kk−1−(k−1)k−1
=
2(k − 2)(k − 1)k−1
B (kk−1 − 2(k − 1)k−1)
So our problem becomes:
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min
λ1,λ2
λ1 + λ2µ s.t.
λ2
(
2B
k − 2 ·
kk−1
kk−1 − (k − 1)k−1 −
4B
k − 2
)
+
kk−1
kk−1 − (k − 1)k−1 = λ1 (24)
λ2
(
2B
k − 2 ·
kk−1
kk−1 − (k − 1)k−1 −
4B
k − 2 +
B
k − 1 −K
)
+
kk−1
kk−1 − (k − 1)k−1 = λ1 (25)
∀λ1 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 2(k − 2)(k − 1)
k−1
B (kk−1 − 2(k − 1)k−1)
It is easy to see that we must have K = Bk−1 . We also know that the solutions
of LP form a convex polytope and this gives us two corner points :(
kk−1
kk−1 − (k − 1)k−1 , 0
)
and (
kk−1 − 2(k − 1)k−1
kk−1 − (k − 1)k−1 ,
2(k − 2)(k − 1)k−1
B (kk−1 − 2(k − 1)k−1)
)
.
The corresponding ratios are : k
k−1
kk−1−(k−1)k−1 and
kk−1−2(k−1)k−1
kk−1−(k−1)k−1 +
2µ(k−2)(k−1)k−1
B(kk−1−2(k−1)k−1) . 
For large k, using Theorem 6 and
(
k
k−1
)k−1
' e, we get that, if µB ≤
e−2
(k−2)(e−1) , then the optimal PDF is:
p(x) =
{
(B+x)k−2(k−1)(2+e)
Bk−1(e−1)(e−2) − 4(k−1)B(e−2) , if 0 ≤ x ≤ Bk−1
0, otherwise.
and otherwise the optimal PDF is:
p(x) =
{
(B+x)k−2(k−1)
Bk−1(e−1) , if 0 ≤ x ≤ Bk−1
0, otherwise.
6 Competitive Analysis for the Sum of Running
Times
Given an adversarial strategy S, and an algorithm A, recall that Γ(T,A) is the
expected time between the start of the transaction’s execution, and the time it
committed. We define the commit cost ρT of a transaction T the number of
consecutive time steps it has to execute for in isolation in order to commit.
Given the optimal decision algorithm, a transaction T , and an adversarial
strategy S, let the abort cost αT (S) under an adversarial strategy be the length
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of time that the algorithm spends executing T minus the commit cost ρT . Notice
that, in the optimal algorithm, every time a transaction is interrupted by the
adversary’s strategy, the choice of whether to continue or not is deterministic,
based on the length of time for which the transaction has already executed, on
the abort cost, and on the remaining length of time for which the transaction
has to execute. Given an adversarial strategy S, define w(S) as the waste of
the optimal algorithm given S, defined as
∑
T αT (S)/
∑
T ρT .
Corollary 1 Under the above conflict model, let A be the randomized requestor
wins strategy, and let OPT be the offline optimal algorithm. Then we have that∑
T Γ(T,A)∑
T Γ(T,OPT )
≤ 2w(S) + 1
w(S) + 1
.
Proof. Let C be a conflict which arises for algorithm A following strategy S.
From our conflict model, we know that the same conflict C must arise for the
optimal decision algorithm as well, although the decision may be different. We
know that there is one receiver transaction T involved in the conflict, to which
we will amortize the cost of this conflict. For our algorithm A, let Cost(C,A)
be the conflict cost, that is, the sum of delays caused by transaction T , plus the
abort cost and delay to T incurred in case T does not commit.
Analogously, let Cost(C,OPT ) be the cost of a conflict C for the optimal
decision algorithm. We get that the sum
∑
C Cost(C,OPT ) =
∑
T αT (S). Be-
cause of the way we defined Cost(C,OPT ) and Cost(C,A) we know from the
properties of the local decision algorithm that
Cost(C,A)
Cost(C,OPT )
≤ 2.
Therefore, we also have that ∑
C Cost(C,A)∑
C Cost(C,OPT )
≤ 2.
Finally, notice that:∑
T Γ(T,A)∑
T Γ(T,OPT )
=
∑
T ρT +
∑
C Cost(C,A)∑
T ρT +
∑
C Cost(C,OPT )
≤
∑
T ρT + 2
∑
T αT∑
T ρT +
∑
T αT
=
2w(S) + 1
w(S) + 1
,
which concludes the proof. 
7 Throughput versus Progress
As described, our framework optimizes solely for throughput, and does not pro-
vide any progress guarantees. In particular, a transaction T which consistently
incurs conflicts at a time when its abort cost B is smaller than its remaining
execution time will always abort, since it is more advantageous for the system
overall to abort this transaction than to delay. However, we can easily adapt our
scheme in a backoff-like manner to address this issue: upon abort, a transaction
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(a) Average cost of various
strategies in the case with
high fixed cost. Here, the
fixed abort cost is B =
2000, and the mean is µ =
500.
(b) Average cost of various
strategies in the case with
low fixed cost. Here, the
fixed abort cost is B = 200
and the mean is µ = 500.
(c) Average cost of various
strategies if the adversary
uses the worst-case distri-
bution for the determinis-
tic strategy.
Figure 2: Results of synthetic tests.
can increase its future abort cost B by an additive or multiplicative amount,
and therefore be less likely to abort on its next execution. We consider the mul-
tiplicative case here, and obtain the following probabilistic progress guarantee
for every transaction:
Corollary 2 A transaction T which encounters γ conflicts during its execution
and has a running time y, commits after at most log y+ log γ+ log k− logB+ 2
attemps, with probability at least 12 .
Proof. We consider the non-constrained case, where we do not have any
knowledge about y. Notice that it is enough to prove that the bounds hold for
requestor wins scenario, since requestor aborts strategy is less likely to abort
the transaction. As noted in Theorem 5, the optimal 2-competitive strategy in
this case is: p(x) = k − 1/B for
0 ≤ x ≤ B/(k − 1), and 0,. Consider the situation after the transaction aborts
log y+log γ+log k− logB+1 times. Let B′ be the current abort cost. Since we
double this cost every time transaction aborts, we have that B′ ≥ 2kyγ. Upon
each conflict, the probability that we do not abort transaction is :
B′
k−1 − y
B′
k−1
= 1− y(k − 1)
B′
≥ 1− 1
2γ
.
Thus, the probability that transaction T commits after log y + log γ + log k −
logB + 2 attempts is at least:
(1− 1
2γ
)
γ
≥ 1/2,
where in the last step we used Bernoulli’s inequality.

8 Experiments
8.1 Synthetic Tests
In this section, we examine how various strategies perform for different types
of distributions, in the case where two transactions are conflicting. We will use
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the following abbreviations:
• RRW (µ) denotes the randomized strategy that we derived for requestor
wins using the constraint on the mean.
• RRA(µ) denotes the randomized strategy for requestor aborts using the
constraint on the mean.
• RRW denotes the randomized strategy for requestor wins we derived with-
out using constraints.
• RRA denotes the randomized strategy for requestor aborts without using
constraints.
• DET denotes the deterministic strategy which we also derived for re-
questor wins without using constraints.
• OPT denotes the optimal strategy.
We benchmarked the decision algorithms in Python, as follows: First, we
draw the length of the transaction r from a given length distribution. We then
pick an index i u.a.r. from that length, which will be the point of interrupt
in the ski rental problem. Note that r − i is the equivalent to the mean in
the ski rental problem. Then, the algorithm picks an index j according to
the above strategies, which will be the time at which we abort. Finally, we
calculate the cost of this choice. The following length distributions were used in
the experiment: Geometric, Normal, Uniform, Exponential and Poisson. The
results are shown in Figures 2a and 2b.
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Figure 3: Throughput results for lock-free stack, queue, and TL2 benchmark.
Note that µ stands for the mean of the length distribution and that B de-
notes the fixed cost that we pay for an abort. Notice that, in Figure 2a, DET
performs quite well. The intuitive reason is these distributions are not adver-
sarial. Therefore, since we choose a large cost B compared to µ, we (almost)
never abort with DET . The second observation is that RRW (µ) and RRA(µ)
perform significantly better than RRW and RRA. The reason is that the in-
equality µB < 2(ln 4− 1) / µB ≤ 2 e−2e−1 holds. The last observation that the cost
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of RRW and RRA is (almost) exactly 2, respectively ee−1 times the optimal
cost, as predicted by the analysis.
Figure 2b represents the case where the fixed cost B is smaller than µ. This
has the following effects on cost: first, DET performs notably worse than before.
The reason is that DET decides to abort based on the cost, and falls short of
this value with higher frequency. Also notice that RRW (µ) and RRA(µ) and
RRW and RRA perform similarly, since the threshold inequality does not hold
most of the time. Further, we notice that the strategies for requestor aborts,
i.e. RRA(µ) and RRA, outperform their respective counterparts from strategy
requestor wins. Figure 2c illustrates cost under the worst-case distribution for
DET .
8.2 Hardware Simulation
Methodology. We use Graphite [22], a tiled multi-core system simulator,
to experiment with real applications. We extend Graphite’s directory-based
MSI cache coherence protocol for private-L1 shared-L2 cache hierarchy to im-
plement a simple functional equivalent of hardware transactional memory with a
requestor-wins policy and lazy validation. In particular, the L1 cache controller
logic (at the cores) is modified for this purpose, while the directory logic did not
have to be modified in any way. We test various conflict resolution techniques
on top of this setup. In particular, we implement the randomized and deter-
ministic delay-setting strategies, as well as a hand-tuned version, which decides
on the amount of delay based on knowledge of the dataset and implementation.
We experiment with two contended data structures implemented using HTM in
this setting: a stack and a queue, as well as a simple transactional application.
The stack and the queue use lock-free designs as “slow path” backups. The
stack and the queue simply alternate inserts and deletes. The transactional
application executes transactions which need to jointly acquire and modify two
out of a set of 64 objects in order to commit.
Results. Please see Figure 3 for the results. The contended data structures
are meant to illustrate a setting where the transaction lengths are short and
stable. In this case, the hand-tuned algorithm does predictably well, since
we are able to identify the exact average fast-path length of transactions. Its
performance is closely followed by the two online algorithms, which improve
significantly on the version which does not implement delays. We observe similar
results for the transactional application with uniform transaction lengths. When
the transactional application alternates between short and long transactions
(the bimodal experiment, in which transactions alternate between short and
very long transactions), we notice that the hand-tuned implementation loses
performance, as the transaction length is less predictable. At the same time, the
version with no delays performs well, since it tends to abort long transactions,
which favors short ones. Of note, the randomized algorithm outperforms all
other strategies at high contention and high variance, as expected.
9 Conclusion
This paper considered the problem of resolving conflicts between transactions
using online decision techniques, and presented optimal algorithms for various
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scenarios arising in real implementations. Our results outline a difference be-
tween the performance of the requestor aborts and requestor wins strategies
in different contention scenarios, and suggest that adding delays can lead to
improvements in terms of practical performance of transactional systems. In
particular, the online algorithms we develop appear to be competitive with
offline hand-tuned algorithms. We note that the simplicity of the optimal re-
questor wins strategy–which just chooses a delay uniformly at random within
some interval–may lend itself to simple implementation in real systems.
In terms of future work, we plan to further investigate the practicality of
our designs through a more precise HTM implementation, and on a wider series
of benchmarks. Due to the complexity of implementing a realistic version of
RTM [1] accurately on a multiprocessor simulator, this task is beyond the scope
of the current work. Second, we aim to further refine our conflict model, and to
examine whether it is possible to provide guarantees on the competitive ratio
under more general conflict models.
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